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SECRECY IN THE COURTS: AT THE TIPPING POINT?
JOSEPH F. ANDERSON, JR.*
The very word "secrecy" is repugnant in a free and open society; and we
are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to
secret oaths and to secret proceedings. We decided long ago that the dan-
gers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far out-
weighed the dangers which are cited to justify it.
-John F. Kennedy'
I. INTRODUCTION-THREE VIGNETTES
A. Alabama's Courthouse Vault
D EEP within the bowels of the United States District Courthouse in
Birmingham, Alabama, there is a vault. Among other things, the
vault contains a file of a lawsuit filed in 2000 by Billy and Tina Farr against
Newell Rubbermaid. The Farrs contend that Newell Rubbermaid (or
Graco Children's Products, one of its subsidiaries) manufactured a prod-
uct that injured their daughter. That, however, is the limit of the informa-
tion made available to the public.
As far as anyone can tell, that case did not involve matters of national
security. The Farrs did not seek to discover trade secrets, customer lists or
other proprietary information that could be used by a competitor. And
the file did not contain what most people would consider indecent or
scandalous material. Yet all of the papers relating to the case, pursuant to
a court order issued by the presiding judge, remain locked in the depths
of the courthouse.
2
B. Johnny Bradley's Tragedy
In July 2004, Johnny Bradley and his wife, Timica, both career Navy
recruiters, began a cross-country trip with their six-year-old son. They in-
tended to visitJohnny's mother in Mississippi en route to their new station
in Pensacola, Florida. Having followed news stories about the dangers
presented by Firestone tires (dangers that had only recently come to light
because earlier Firestone problems had been the subject of court-ordered
secrecy"), Johnny chose to equip his Ford Explorer with Cooper tires and
*United States District Judge, District of South Carolina.
1. John F. Kennedy, The President and the Press, Address Before the Ameri-
can Newspaper Publishers Association, in 1 PUB. PAPERS 334 (1961).
2. See generally TED Gup, NATION OF SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 225-27 (2007).
3. See Keith Bradsher, S. U. V. Tire Defects Were Known in '96 but Not Reported, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Al.
(811)
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even had his vehicle checked at a local repair shop before leaving
California.
While in New Mexico, with Timica behind the wheel and their son
asleep, the tire tread separated on one of the rear Cooper tires. The vehi-
cle rolled over four times, killing Timica instantly and rendering Johnny
unconscious for two weeks. He missed his wife's funeral. Only then did
Johnny Bradley, perhaps the most prudent of all reasonable men, learn
that Cooper tires, too, had been the subject of over two hundred lawsuits,
but that "almost all of [the] documents were kept confidential through
various protective orders [at] the demand [of] the tire company and en-
tered by courts around the country so that vital information that could
have saved [his] family would never be disclosed to the public."4
C. Florida's Black Hole
In 2006, the State of Florida helped add a verb to the legal lexicon:
"to superseal. ' '5 The term was coined by Miami Herald reporters who dis-
covered that three Florida counties had been maintaining a secret docket
since 2001, and that the secret docket consisted of nearly two hundred
cases. 6 The supersealed cases included "negligence, malpractice, and
fraud cases [that] all vanished into a kind of legal black hole where it
[was] impossible to tell notjust what [was] in them, but that they exist[ed]
at all."
7
These three vignettes are the result of a legal system characterized by
defendants who are wary of their alleged misdeeds being permanently
spread upon the public record; plaintiffs' lawyers who are all too eager to
submit to a gag order by the court-especially when the consented-to gag
order adds to a plaintiff's settlement figure; and judges who are eager to
speedily and economically relieve their burgeoning case loads. Four years
ago, I wrote extensively on what I then perceived to be a "discernable and
troubling trend" of court-ordered secrecy in civil litigation and its perni-
cious effects.8 In this article, I will briefly revisit some of the opposing
arguments, provide a battle-line account of actual rule changes and ob-
serve why I am encouraged by the progress being made by the anti-secrecy
movement.
4. The Sunshine in Litigation Act: Does Court Secrecy Undermine Public Health and
Safety: Hearing on S. 2449 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Con-
sumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (oral testimony of Johnny Bradley).
5. Patrick Danner & Dan Christensen, Court Cases Hidden from Public, MiAmi
HERALD, Apr. 16, 2006, at Al.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. SeeJoseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The
Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711, 712 (2004).
[Vol. 53: p. 811
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss5/2
2008] SECRECY IN THE COURTS: AT THE TIPPING POINT?
II. THE DEBATE CONTINUES
The debate over "court-ordered" secrecy has festered for several de-
cades. I prefer to use the term "court-ordered" or "government-enforced"
secrecy because the problem, as I see it, does not arise when parties re-
solve between themselves to quietly settle their dispute and not discuss it
with others. The problem, and the resulting harm to our legal system,
arises when the attorneys present the judge with a "take it or leave it" or-
der that includes some form of secrecy, thus bringing the might and maj-
esty of the federal court system to bear upon anyone who violates the
confidentiality that is ordered.
As a judge on the court with what has been described as "the most
restrictive anti-secrecy rule ever adopted in the American Courts,"9 I have
observed the ongoing academic debate with more than passing interest.
What strikes me as odd is that the arguments rarely meet: public access
advocates and confidentiality proponents cannot seem to bringjoinder to
the issues. 10
For example, public access advocates speak of tire separations that kill
people; I1 confidentiality proponents stress the need to protect the secret
formula for Coca-Cola, 12 personal diaries13 and divorce records. 14 Public
access advocates emphasize the undesirability of securing a court order
that mandates secrecy;15 confidentiality proponents suggest that the par-
ties are free to simply agree between themselves to keep things confiden-
tial, without a court order.16 Public access advocates point to episodes
where hundreds of cases are maintained on a secret court docket, making
it impossible to tell that the cases even exist;17 confidentiality proponents
ignore such developments, perhaps recognizing that they cannot defend
9. David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the Exi-
gency of National Reform, 53 DuKE L.J. 807, 821 (2003).
10. In describing the two opposing camps in the court secrecy debate, I have
adopted the designation used by Professor Laurie Kratky Dore: "public access ad-
vocates" and "confidentiality proponents." See Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Con-
sent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 283, 303 (1999).
11. See Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Gov-
erning Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
375, 375 (2006).
12. See Arthur Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARv. L. Rv. 427, 469 (1991).
13. See Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (At Last) That the Fed-
eral Rules Do Not Declare That Discovery is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
331, 340-41 (2006).
14. See id. at 338.
15. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 727-31.
16. See Stephen E. Darling, Confidential Settlements: The Defense Perspective, 55
S.C. L. REV. 785, 788 (2004).
17. See Danner & Christensen, supra note 5.
813
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the indefensible.18 Public access advocates stress the duplicative transac-
tion costs incurred when records produced in case number one are de-
stroyed and then must be fought over again in case number two;'
9
confidentiality proponents argue that for a mere "$100 filing fee" (actually
$350), a plaintiff who gets sick on a ham sandwich can bring a federal
lawsuit and then conduct discovery on the operation of a hog farm.20
Public access advocates give examples where civil litigation has served to
expose and punish threats to public safety when the regulatory process has
failed to do so;21 confidentiality proponents bemoan the fact that elec-
tronic data storage has made it possible to retain enormous amounts of
information. 22
Court-ordered secrecy, properly understood, includes any court order
that restricts access to information about a case and its procedural history.
It is much more than merely sealing the amount paid to settle a case.
Rather, it can include court directives to return or destroy documents pro-
duced in discovery; seal all or part of the court file; alter or create court
records to make it difficult (or even impossible) to tell the identity of the
litigants or the disposition of the case; and vacate or remove previously-
entered orders, thereby literally removing a precedent from the books. In
my twenty-one years on the bench, I have received requests by one-or
often both-of the parties to do all of these things.
A. The Case for Public Access
In recent years, public access advocates, citing cases like those just
mentioned, have suggested that changes to the applicable civil rules, or
even legislation, are necessary to address the deleterious effects of court-
enforced secrecy. Northwestern University School of Law Professor Daniel
Givelber, writing with Tufts University School of Medicine Professor
Anthony Robbins, observed:
Civil litigation uncovers a great deal of otherwise unavailable in-
formation about practices and products which may cause disease
and injury. However, common practices in and related to law-
suits, trials, and courts, such as protective orders, sealing orders,
and confidential settlements, can deprive public health authori-
18. Despite widespread news coverage of the secret docket that existed in
Florida, I am not aware of anyone who has come forward to defend it.
19. See Paul D. Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for
Draftsmen of Rules for State Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 456, 468 (2000) ("The
diseconomies of redundant discovery ought to be avoided if possible ...
[D]iscovery rules should generally obligate parties to produce discovery materials
produced in other like cases even if those cases were resolved short of trial.").
20. See Hearings, supra note 4 (oral testimony of Stephen G. Morrison).
21. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 748 n.125 (describing jury verdict for puni-
tive damages awarded when Federal Trade Commission mandate was ignored by
manufacturer of insulation product).
22. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 342.
[Vol. 53: p. 811
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss5/2
2008] SECRECY IN THE COURTS: AT THE TIPPING POINT?
ties and the public itself of information that might be helpful to
prevent disease, injury, disability, and death. 23
In prepared testimony submitted to a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, Les-
lie A. Bailey, a California attorney with Public Justice, succinctly described
the dangers associated with court secrecy:
Famous examples abound of damaging information revealed in
litigation but kept secret from the public for long periods of
time: Bic lighters, car seats, breast implants, and all-terrain vehi-
cles were all subject to protective orders while countless consum-
ers continued to be at risk from using them. Doctors continued
unknowingly to implant defective heart valves into patients, even
though documents disclosed in litigation-but concealed from
the public for far too long-revealed a high risk of valve failure.
Manufacturers of dangerous drugs settled cases brought by in-
jured patients on terms that forbade the patients' attorneys from
notifying the FDA that the drug caused harm. 24
The platform of the public access advocates is simple: transparency should
be required when it is in the public interest.
B. Arguments of the Confidentiality Proponents
Confidentiality proponents, spinning gossamer arguments that miss
the mark entirely, suggest that personal injury and death associated with
the excessive use of secrecy "are not even a blip on the screen" 25 and that
"cries for 'public safety' are "really more splash than substance. '26 Mod-
est proposals to reign in the excessive use of protective orders in those
admittedly small number of cases where public safety or the public interest
are involved are said to threaten defendants' "secret formulae." 27 Articles
in leading periodicals, bearing titles such as "The Secret to Keeping Settle-
ments Secret"28 (accompanied by a cartoon drawing of a box of court
records at the bottom of a lake with puzzled fish looking at them), even
suggest ways to get around "the array of sunshine laws" 29 that have been
enacted in recent years.
Confidentiality proponents-believing that public officials whose job
description is "trial judge" will go to any length to avoid a trial-suggest
that court rules or legislation designed to promote transparency will deter
23. Daniel J. Givelber & Anthony Robbins, Public Health Versus Court-Sponsored
Secrecy, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 131 (2006).
24. Hearings, supra note 4, at 3-4 (written statement of Leslie A. Bailey).
25. See id. at 8 (written statement of Robert N. Weiner).
26. See Dawn Shawger McCord, The Secret to Keeping Settlements Secret, LITIG.,
Summer 2007, at 45, 47.
27. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 9 (oral testimony of Robert N. Weiner).
28. See McCord, supra note 26, at 45, 46.
29. Id. at 48.
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settlements and inevitably cause the number of cases going to trial to in-
crease dramatically, thus overwhelming the judicial system. Professor Ar-
thur Miller's seminal work, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access
to the Courts"0 suggested as much.3 1 As I will discuss later, when a federal
anti-secrecy rule in South Carolina was published for comment, fully
three-fourths of the respondents, many citing Professor Miller, made chil-
led settlements their principal argument.3 2 When I spoke about the pend-
ing South Carolina rule change at a gathering of defense attorneys, I was
told by one member of the audience that I could expect to try "hundreds
and hundreds of cases per year" if the rule passed. 33 Well, the rule passed
30. See Miller, supra note 12.
31. See id. at 483 ("[If protective orders were limited] more litigants would
likely pursue a full adjudication of the merits ....").
32. See Public Responses to Proposed Local Rule 5.03(c) D.S.C. (on file with
author). The following are typical of the comments received from opponents of
the proposed rule:
"[E]limination of confidential settlement agreements will serve as a disin-
centive for settlement in a majority of civil disputes." Letter from H. Mills
Gallivan, Esq., President, S.C. Def. Trial Attorneys' Ass'n, to author (July
23, 2002) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
"Defendants will more likely submit to trial rather than settle claims if
settlement agreements could no longer be subject to a protective order.
This in turn would further burden already overcrowded court dockets."
Letter from Joyce E. Kraeger, Esq., Alliance of Am. Insurers, to author
(Sept. 12, 2002) (on file with author).
"[If the rule amendment is adopted] it will as a practical matter be more
difficult to counsel clients to compromise and settle disputed cases." Let-
ter from David E. Dukes, Esq., Member of the Bd. of Dirs., Def. Research
Inst., to author (July 24, 2002) (on file with author).
"[C]onfidentiality of settlements is often an important factor for the
plaintiff as well as the defendant in negotiating the settlement of a
case.... The absence of confidentiality would impede settlement of some
cases." Letter from Henry B. Smythe, Jr., Esq., to author (July 24, 2002)
(on file with author).
"Such a rule ... would also deter many settlements, which is contrary to
the interests of the parties, the courts, and the public." Letter from Greg-
ory LaCost, Esq., Nat'l Ass'n of Indep. Insurers, to author (Sept. 30, 2002)
(on file with author).
"[B]y eliminating the continued use of confidential settlement agree-
ments, the Court ...may also, in instances where an insured has the
power to reject a settlement, make the difference in whether the case is
settled or proceeds to trial." Letter from J. Donald Tierney, Am. Int'l
Cos., to author (Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with author).
"[T]he proposed rule would likely discourage parties from settling litiga-
tion if the parties desire that the terms of the agreement should remain
confidential .... Letter from DanielJ. Popeo, Gen. Counsel, & Paul D.
Kamenar, Senior Executive Counsel, Wash. Legal Found., to author
(Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with author).
"[T]he proposed amendment... may ultimately result in a chilling effect on set-
tlements of civil disputes." Letter from H. Mills Gallivan, Esq., President, S.C. Def.
Trial Attorneys' Ass'n, to author (Sept. 26, 2002) (on file with author).
33. See William Davies, Esq., Remarks at the South Carolina Defense Trial At-
torneys' Convention (July 27, 2002).
[Vol. 53: p. 811
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in late 2002, and in the ensuing five years, our entire court, consisting of
thirteen district judges, has not tried one hundred cases collectively.3 4
Undeterred by statistics belying their chilled settlements argument,
confidentiality proponents-apparently believing this is the one argument
that carries weight with judges and legislators-continue to repeat it at
every opportunity.3 5 Quite apart from the empirical invalidity of the argu-
ment, it also suffers from an illogical premise: if litigants can no longer
cajole judges into ordering secrecy, they will respond by airing their dis-
putes in the most public of forums, a public trial before ajury in an open
courtroom. It is long past time for this flawed argument to be put to rest.
Recently, some confidentiality proponents have retreated to a differ-
ent-and entirely inconsistent-argument. Focusing only on the settle-
ment stage, they suggest that because sealed settlements are so infrequent,
no rule change is necessary. Apparently, they base this contention on a
study suggesting that less than one half of one percent of all civil cases are
concluded with a gag order entered by the court.
3 6
The problem with this argument is that public access advocates have
never asserted that, in terms of sheer numbers, court-ordered secrecy
reaches gargantuan proportions. Rather, what I and other public access
advocates decried was "a discernable and troubling trend' for litigants to
ask for secrecy in the admittedly small number of cases where public safety
or the public interest might be adversely affected.37 As I have observed:
There is little concern about confidentiality in cases involving a
decision of whether some provision of the Internal Revenue
Code is retroactive, but an auto dealer found to have rolled back
odometers (who wants to remain in business) will want his settle-
ment, and the evidence proving the wrongful conduct, sealed by
court order. It would be rare for a judge to be asked for court-
ordered secrecy in a case involving the collection of a past due
student loan, but that same judge will be told that the return and
34. The trial figures of the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina are:
1998: 75 trials 2003: 14 trials
1999: 63 trials 2004: 17 trials
2000: 46 trials 2005: 20 trials
2001: 42 trials 2006: 13 trials
2002: 21 trials 2007: 20 trials
E-mail from Stacey Wilson, UNIX System Administrator, U. S. Dist. Court, Dist. of
S.C., to Gail Hayden, Judicial Assistant to Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Jan. 31,
2008) [hereinafter E-mail from Stacy Wilson] (on file with author).
35. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (written statement of Senator Orrin G.
Hatch) ("Greater public access to materials obtained through discovery and to set-
tlement agreements might create disincentives to settlement, increasing litigation
costs and the caseload of the federal courts.").
36. See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLE-
MENTS RELATIVELY RARE IN FEDERAL COURT (2004), available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealset3.pdf/$file/sealset3.pdf.
37. Anderson, supra note 8, at 712 (emphasis added).
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destruction of all documents is the sine qua non of a settlement
of a groundwater contamination case.3 8
I will acknowledge one persuasive argument for confidentiality re-
garding settlement, which, to my surprise, the proponents rarely make.
Occasionally, the disclosure of the terms of a settlement-even what some
might term a nuisance value settlement-might invite frivolous "copy cat"
lawsuits. As Professor Miller put it:
From the defendant's perspective, confidentiality ensures that
the settlement amount will not be used to encourage the com-
mencement of other lawsuits that never would have been
brought or as unfair leverage to extract a similar payment in sub-
sequent suits that may be meritless.39
This phenomenon occurs most frequently in employment dispute cases.
For example, a company terminates an employee known by everyone in
the workplace to be a poor performer and a chronic complainer. In the
resulting lawsuit, the company makes a business decision to end the un-
happy episode by paying the departed employee a modest settlement, with
no admission of liability. For understandable reasons, the defendant com-
pany does not want its remaining workers made aware of the settlement
details; hence, a gag order is insisted upon and, I will concede, is defensi-
ble in such situations.
Confidentiality proponents make no such concessions to the other
side. The lawsuits mentioned at the beginning of this article are just a few
illustrations where the actions ofjudges have been inimicable to the pub-
lic interest. There are many more cases that have been cited by other
authors.40 Unfortunately, I have yet to see the confidentiality proponent
forces rush to the defense of what really occurred in these documented
cases where secrecy predominated.
38. Id. at 738-39.
39. Miller, supra note 12, at 485.
40. See, e.g., Dor6, supra note 10 (surveying issue of secrecy from ethical per-
spective) ; James E. Rooks, Jr., Settlements and Secrets, Is the Sunshine Chilly ? 55 S.C. L.
REv. 859 (2004); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You
Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2J. INST. FOR STUDy LEGAL ETHICS 115 (1999) (discuss-
ing how, under rules of ethics, "lawyers are bound to settle cases in ways which
serve the needs of the specific clients while potentially harming the interests of
society as a whole"); Thomas A. Fogarty, Can Court's Cloak of Secrecy be Deadly? Judi-
cial Orders Protecting Companies Kept Tire Case Quiet, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2000, at Bi
(discussing effects of "pervasive secrecy in America's court system"); Stephen Gil-
lers, Court Sanctioned Secrets Can Kill, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at 13 (blaming se-
cret court settlements for curbing ability to prevent further deaths from faulty
products); Ben Kelley, As You Were Saying ... Secret Court Settlements Prevent Needed
Warnings, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 16, 2003, at 18 (noting that "[c]ourt-endorsed
secrecy agreements are enemies of public health progress"); Walter V. Robinson,
Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases Settlements Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public
Eye, BOSTON GLOBE,Jan. 31, 2002, at Al (discussing how "secrecy allows for further
wrongful acts to continue").
818 [Vol. 53: p. 811
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Instead, confidentiality proponents advance arguments that are easily
refuted and are typically ignoratio elenchi.4 1 Confidentiality proponents in-
cant the mantra that litigants do not give up their privacy rights by going
to court. Inevitably, they bring up "secret formulas" that deserve to be
protected. 42 They also raise other peripheral arguments, such as the need
to protect, among other things, "religious documents." 43 Ignoring the
many examples (usually with specific reference to the names of the liti-
gants, the jurisdiction and the relevant time period), they contend that
pleas for sunshine in litigation are based primarily on "anecdotal
evidence."
44
Confidentiality proponents zealously argue that litigants can always
shield information from public view by simply agreeing between them-
selves to do so, without court involvemeht. In a principled debate about
the desirability of rules of procedures or legislation proscribing court orders
imposing secrecy, this argument has no place. Litigants who are satisfied
with the right to contract with other litigants for confidentiality have no
standing to complain about rules restricting court-ordered secrecy.
But as I and others have written, it is the court's imprimatur that liti-
gants desiring secrecy covet. 45 They do not want a bipartite agreement;
they want a court mandate. This allows them to hide behind the judge's
41. Ignoratio elenchi means "ignorance of the conclusion to be proved."
BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 763 (8th ed. 2004) (providing Latin translation).
42. The typical practice of changing the subject was prevalent in recent testi-
mony before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee considering Senator Kohl's Sun-
shine in Litigation bill. Five minutes after Johnny Bradley's riveting testimony
about his wife's death, a witness on the other side of the debate-ignoring entirely
Bradley's tragic loss-lamented that "if you file a lawsuit ... you get the right to
take a deposition asking anything.... That can encompass.., personal informa-
tion for a corporation, it can encompass personnel records, secret formulas of the
product-all sorts of information." Hearings, supra note 4 (oral testimony of Rob-
ert N. Weiner).
43. See Miller, supra note 12, at 466.
44. See id. at 480 ("Is it true that protective orders and court seals keep infor-
mation regarding public health and safety hidden? Thus far, assertions to that
effect have been supported primarily by anecdotal evidence; research or statistical
evidence is completely nonexistent.").
45. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 727-31 (discussing impact of court-ordered
secrecy on parties' ability to settle); see also Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Con-
fidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 357, 371 (2006) ("Lawyers and litigants
... often are unsatisfied with [a confidentiality] agreement in the absence of a
court order. The protective order adds two things to the parties' confidentiality
agreement: the power of contempt, and whatever symbolic power the court's im-
primatur carries.").
819
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signature when they decline to discuss the case with inquiring media, 46
other litigants47 and perhaps even regulatory authorities. 48
When answering the public safety and public interest concerns of
those who support transparency, confidentiality proponents point out that
the alleged defect, fraudulent practice or dangerous side effect can always
be discerned by reading the complaint, so that a court order of confidenti-
ality at settlement does no harm. There are two responses to this argu-
ment. First, there is no way to read the complaint if the entire case file is
sealed by court order. Though it is true that such circumscribing orders
are rare, they do exist.49 Second, our courts experience a staggering num-
ber of civil filings each year. In 2006, the most recent year for which
figures are available, there were 270,171 civil filings in the United States
District Courts. 50 Some of these cases are dismissed as frivolous or merit-
less. Some are voluntarily withdrawn. Others are concluded by a grant of
summary judgment. One could not reasonably, nor timely, expect to
learn of legitimate public concerns by pouring through the allegations of
the complaints as they enter the docketing system. It is only after the facts
have been explored, primarily through discovery, that a serious assessment
can be made as to potential threats to public safety.
46. To take just one example, a decade before his celebrated criminal trial,
singer Michael Jackson was a defendant in a civil case involving allegations of sex-
ual misconduct with a thirteen-year-old boy. The case was settled with a court or-
der imposing confidentiality. When asked about the charges, Jackson responded
that he was "not allowed to talk about [the case] by way of law." 20/20: Living with
Michael Jackson .(ABC television broadcast Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.
mjshouse.com/stories/livingwithmjtranscript.html.
47. For example, in Section 1983 litigation, a plaintiff must show a "pattern or
custom" of misconduct in order to maintain an action against a municipality that
employed a rogue police officer. The easiest way to show this is by reference to
earlier litigation. Attorneys have appealed to me to seal a settlement for the ex-
press purpose of preventing the litigation from being used as "pattern and custom"
evidence in later litigation.
48. See, e.g., Jim Shamp, System Helps Hide Hospitals' Mistakes, HERALD SUN(Durham, N.C.), Mar. 9, 2003, at Al (explaining how "closed-door settlements may
allow hospitals and doctors to deny culpability and circumvent error-reporting re-
quirements of regulatory agencies").
49. See Danner & Christensen, supra note 5; see also Frank Geary, The Case of the
Missing Suits, LAs VEGAS REv. J., Feb. 11, 2007, at J1. Geary noted:
As if written with invisible ink, dozens of lawsuits filed in Southern Ne-
vada courts virtually have disappeared after judges decided they should
be hidden from the public. Along with the dispute described in each
lawsuit, also kept secret are the outcomes of each lawsuit, the name of the
judge who sealed each case, whether the plaintiff or defendant had asked
that the lawsuit be sealed, and any explanation by ajudge for abandoning
the fundamental principle that courts shall be open to the public.
Id.
50. OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICES OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATIS-
TICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERALJUDICIARY DECEMBER 31, 2006 tbl.C. (2006), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec06/C00Dec06.pdf.
[Vol. 53: p. 811
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III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE
In 2002, while serving as Chief Judge of the district court in the Dis-
trict of South Carolina, I proposed a local rule, known as Rule 5.03(c). 51
This rule was designed to curtail the excessive use of court-ordered secrecy
in cases that had the potential to adversely affect public safety or the oper-
ation of government.
The rule ultimately adopted by the judges of our court was actually
broader than I had initially proposed. It bars any court-sealed settlements.
A safety-valve exists, however, as Rule 1.02 allows the suspension or modifi-
cation of any local rule "for good cause shown."5 2 This establishes a
strong "preference for openness at settlement, while still preserving the abil-
ity of the presiding judge to seal a settlement when, for example, proprie-
tary information or trade secrets need to be protected or a particularly
vulnerable party needs to be shielded from the glare of an otherwise news-
worthy settlement."53
The South Carolina rule has worked well in practice. As noted ear-
lier, the rule has had no effect whatsoever on the number of cases going to
trial. 54 Colonel Sanders's secret recipe containing eleven herbs and spices
is still safe in the Palmetto State. The business community-primary op-
ponents of the rule when it was first published-has not shunned South
Carolina, as new business investment has gone up each year since 2002.
5 5
More importantly, the rule has served its desired purpose: protecting pro-
prietary information when necessary, and requiring transparency when in
the public interest.
To cite just a few examples from our court, confidential settlements
have been imposed when documents have been filed under seal in cases
such as an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act by
a group of employees against a former employer. 56 On the other hand,
51. Today, the Rule is codified as District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina Rule 5.03(E).
52. See D.S.C. R. 1.02. Rule 1.02 states: "For good cause shown in a particular
case, the Court may suspend or modify any Local Civil Rule." Id.
53. Anderson, supra note 8, at 723.
54. See E-mail from Stacey Wilson, supra note 34 (indicating that number of
trials remained constant between 2003 and 2007).
55. E-mail from Meredith Cleland, Agent, S.C. Dep't of Revenue, to Shiva
Hodges, Law Clerk to Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Jan. 16, 2008) (on file with
author) (charting annual increases in total assessed property tax values for busi-
nesses in South Carolina for years 2000 through 2007).
56. See Wilkes v. SCANA Corp., No. 3:07-2402 (D.S.C. filed Dec. 28, 2007).
Filing was permitted under seal upon finding that:
[T]here is no practical way to present the relevant factual and legal issues
in the case to the Court without the use of documents containing the
personal and confidential information of third parties .... The public
has little or no interest in this civil litigation between private parties or in
the documents identified as containing personal and confidential infor-
mation of third parties [and, to] the extent that the public has any inter-
est in the matter in dispute in this case, such interest is adequately served
11
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court files have remained opened, over litigants' requests for secrecy, in
cases where:
* A South Carolina man was severely and permanently injured when
riding in a Ford F-150 pickup truck equipped with an allegedly de-
fective latch.
57
* A South Carolina physician defending a wrongful death suit was
shown to have dispensed steroids and human growth hormone to
National Football League players.58
" An airline and one of its pilots asserted competing claims (the air-
line contended that the pilot was negligent in flying its planes and
the pilot contended that the airline discriminated against him).59
Moreover, in a marked departure from earlier practice,60 the names
of the defendants in medical malpractice cases in South Carolina are no
longer shielded from public view.
6 1
IV. WE HAVE IT BACKWARDS
As I suggested earlier, it is only after the facts have been explored,
primarily through discovery, that a serious assessment can be made as to
by the information not subject to the instant Motion, such as the plead-
ings, memoranda, and non-confidential documents on file.
Id.
57. SeeJohn Monk, Ford Settlement Open for All to See, STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
June 19, 2005, at BI. The article stated:
A 2-year-old court order requires such settlements be open-as opposed
to sealed secretly-in federal courts in South Carolina. As a result, the
S.C. settlement may be the first publicly disclosed payout that Ford has
made in defective latch cases around the nation, according to lawyers Ed
Bell of Georgetown and Kevin Dean of Charleston's Motley Rice Law
Firm. Last year, Ford settled a similar case alleging a defective latch in
Texas. But in that case, a judge-acting at Ford's request-ordered the
amount of the settlement kept secret. In the Texas case, two women died
after their F-150 rolled over.
Id.
58. Bibeau v. Shortt, No. 3:04-22306 (D.S.C. filed Sept. 22, 2004) (transcript
of March 3, 2005 hearing before Senior United States District Judge Matthew J.
Perry, Jr.).
59. See Baroody v. Bankair, Inc., No. 3:03-0578 (D.S.C. filed Feb. 21, 2003);
Bankair, Inc. v. Baroody, No. 3:02-2840 (D.S.C. filed Aug. 23, 2002). In those
cases, United States District Judge Margaret B. Seymour, citing District of South
Carolina Local Rule 5.03, declined a joint request to seal "all of the filings" in the
case and to delete "reference to these cases from the court's record keeping sys-
tems." See Consent Motion to Seal Case and Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties in Support Thereof at 2, Bankair, Inc., Nos. 3:02-2840, 3:03-0578 (D.S.C.
motion was filed in both cases on December 15, 2003-oral order denying motion
was filed during hearing held on April 29, 2004).
60. For a description of the formerly widespread practice of withholding the
names of physicians in medical negligence suits, see John Monk, Medical Mistakes
Kept Secret, STATE (Columbia, S.C.),June 18, 2002, at Al.
61. See, e.g., $400,000 Settlement Ends Lawsuit over Man's Death, STATE (Colum-
bia, S.C.), Nov. 25, 2007, at B3 (identifying defendant physician and amount of
settlement).
[Vol. 53: p. 811
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potential threats to public safety. The trend towards secrecy at or near the
end of a high profile civil litigation stands in sharp contrast to what takes
place when events giving rise to the litigation first occur.
In the age of saturation news coverage, it is not at all unusual for
future litigants, as well as their families and supporters, to take to the air-
waves and news wires in an effort to get their version of the facts and legal
principles before the public. Commentators often refer to this practice as
an attempt to proselytize potential jurors-a practice declared unethical
by most jurisdictions.
Consider one recent example: in late December 2007, California
teenager Nataline Sarkisyan died after her parents' health care provider,
CIGNA Corp., allegedly delayed its approval of a potentially life-saving
liver transplant. Two scant days after her death, her family's attorney, Cali-
fornia lawyer Mark Geragos, told a national television audience:
[T]hey used every pretext in the book to claim that [the liver
transplant] was experimental even though the doctors unani-
mously at UCLA said she needs it, she's a good candidate. And,
they actually gave the odds at sixty-five percent over six months
for somebody similarly situated. And then some bean counter
over at CIGNA decided that they not only didn't want to pay for
that, but they did not want to pay for the aftercare.
[T]he thing that is just so galling about this is [that] there are
people who are not even doctors, they've got nurses, they've got
people who are trained there ... supposedly to make these deci-
sions. But they're practicing medicine without a license, number
one. One of the reasons that I've called for and I'm gonna con-
tinue to call for and submit to the D.A. here ... literally a request
for a filing on CIGNA for manslaughter or murder is that I think
and I've gotten hundreds, if not thousands of e-mails today from
people who used to work at CIGNA who say that they have a cor-
porate policy of saying, "deny, deny, deny and hopefully the peo-
ple will die and that'll be the end of it."62
Most would agree that if, as Geragos contends, "bean counters" at a major
U.S. health insurance corporation ignored the unanimous opinions of
physicians, practiced medicine without a license or committed murder,
and these were allegations supported by "hundreds, if not thousands" of
former company employees, the public has a legitimate right to the details
of these transgressions. Yet, we have no proven facts. All we have are Ger-
62. Geraldo at Large (Fox News television broadcast Dec. 22, 2007).
823
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agos's incendiary (and possibly unethical) broadsides issued before the
first deposition has even been taken.
63
The time for the public to critically examine what actually happened
in Nataline Sarkisyan's case is after the facts have been developed in the
crucible of adversary litigation. Unfortunately, if the case plays out as
many of the others described in this Article, the public will never know if
Geragos's sensational (and almost certainly, overstated) allegations are
true. This is because the attorneys will attempt to shroud discovery in se-
crecy with a comprehensive protective order, and the settlement, if one
ever occurs, will likely be kept secret.
As Professor Scott A. Moss pointed out:
Lawsuits are tales that begin with great fanfare and suspense, with
fire-and-brimstone pleadings telling dueling stories of injustice
and lies, followed by contentious pretrial battles. Yet most law-
suits are tales that end abruptly, with a whimper of a one-page
"voluntary dismissal" that ends the dispute without explanation,
making it appear "that the plaintiff simply gave up."
63. California-the state where Sarkisyan resided at the time of her death,
where Geragos practices law and where CIGNA is headquartered-enforces the
following rule regarding trial publicity:
Rule 5-120. Trial Publicity.
(A) A member who is participating or has participated in the investiga-
tion or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication if the member knows or reasonably should know
that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adju-
dicative proceeding in the matter.
(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (A), a member may state:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohib-
ited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto; [and]
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person in-
volved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likeli-
hood of substantial harm to an individual or the public interest ....
(C) Notwithstanding paragraph (A), a member may make a statement
that a reasonable member would believe is required to protect a client
from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initi-
ated by the member or the member's client. A statement made pursuant
to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to
mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 5-120 (2008).
[Vol. 53: p. 811
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[S]o many lawsuits ... [end] with the legal equivalent of "never
mind."6 4
In other words, we have it exactly backwards. We need less talking
when the facts are not fully developed-at the commencement of litiga-
tion-and more openness when the facts have been tested on the cold,
hard anvil of sharp litigation-at the conclusion of the case.
V. AT THE TIPPING POINT?
Recent developments regarding court-ordered secrecy are encourag-
ing. Forty-one jurisdictions have now adopted some type of anti-secrecy
measure, whether by legislation or court rule.65 More importantly, judges,
who in the past were willing to "sign an order that stipulated that the
moon was made out of cheese" 66 if it would settle a case, are now much
more circumspect about court-ordered secrecy. As one legal periodical
observed:
Many lawyers on both sides [of the debate] agree on one thing:
The landscape has changed. Judges, they say, are far less likely to
sign off automatically on confidential settlements, even where
the parties consent, than they were a few years ago.
67
Another commentator, speaking primarily of developments in the state of
Texas, suggested that "[n]owjudges are falling out of love with court-ap-
proved secret settlements because of public safety issues." 68 Many judges
have commented to me that the national furor that erupted when South
Carolina's rule was proposed caused them to become more sensitive to the
harm to the legal system (not to mention potential harm to members of
the public at large) that flows from the excessive use of "gag orders on
demand."69
64. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869-70 (2007).
65. See, e.g., AM. ASS'N FOR JUST., STATUTES AND COURT RULES RELATED TO
COURT SECRECY (2007), available at http://www.atla.org/pressroom/FACTS/se-
crecy/antisecrecyprovisions2007.doc.
66. 20/20: The Secrets They Keep (ABC television broadcast Aug. 29, 1992) (on
file with author).
67. David Hechler, Secrecy in Settlements as a Public Safety Issue, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
12, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePinterFriendlyNLJ.
jsp?id=1073667908617.
68. Charles Noteboom, Courts Get Wise to Harmful Secret Settlements, TEX. LAw.,
Oct. 11, 2002, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=
1032128721406.
69. Typical of the feedback I have received from judges is a letter from my
friend, United States District Judge William R. Wilson of Arkansas. It reads:
Since reading your law review article [appearing at 55 S.C. L. REv. 711
(2004) ], I require lawyers submitting such an order to certify that it (the
order) complies with the notions set forth in your article. My law clerks
and I then double check the proposed order before entering it. I would
like to see a national rule requiring something of this nature.
15
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The controversy has resonated throughout the academic community,
with articles focusing on such diverse matters as the economic aspect of
court-ordered secrecy7 0 and the possibility that secrecy agreements and
practice restrictions in settlement contracts should be prohibited not only
by ethics rules, but also by civil and criminal law.7 1 Additionally, two na-
tional fora7 2 on the issue have been conducted and a third has been or-
ganized by Villanova Law School for early 2008.
73
Wisconsin Senator Herbert Kohl, himself the product of a state that
"has a long history of providing open access to court records and docu-
ments," continues to press for federal legislation on the subject.7 4 Senator
Letter from William R. Wilson to author (Aug. 20, 2007) (on file with author).
70. See Moss, supra note 64. Interestingly, Moss concluded that contrary to
the conventional wisdom that banning confidentiality would inhibit settlement, a
ban could promote early settlements. See id. at 872 (suggesting that "a ban could
not effectively cover settlements reached before litigation, so a ban reaching only
postfiling settlements would yield more confidential prefiling settlements").
71. See John P. Freeman, The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing, 55
S.C. L. REv. 829, 832 (2004) ("[L]awyers and judges need look no further than
their professional ethical obligations in order to decide that they cannot partici-
pate in furthering secrecy agreements relating to legal disputes."); see also David A.
Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels
and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1217, 1218 (2003) (arguing that secret
legal settlements "should not only be curtailed by the ethics rules that govern the
conduct of lawyers, but also by the civil and criminal law and the Rules of Civil
Procedure").
72. See Symposium, Court Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711 (2004); Sympo-
sium, Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2006).
73. See Symposium, The Future of Judicial Transparency, 53 VILL. L. REv. 639
(2008).
74. Andrew J. Schwaba, Secret Settlements: Do We Need a Sunshine in Litigation
Act?, 76 Wis. LAW. No. 10 (Oct. 2003).
Senator Kohl originally proposed his Sunshine in Litigation bill in 1990 and
has re-introduced it in each succeeding Congress. The current version of the pro-
posed legislation before the 110th Congress is:
To amend chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, relating to protec-
tive orders, sealing of cases, disclosures of discovery information in civil
actions, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2007".
SEC. 2. RESTRICTIONS ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS AND SEALING
OF CASES AND SETTLEMENTS.
(a) In General- Chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
§ 1660. Restrictions on protective orders and sealing of cases and
settlements
(a) (1) A court shall not enter an order under rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure restricting the disclosure of information ob-
tained through discovery, an order approving a settlement agreement
that would restrict the disclosure of such information, or an order re-
stricting access to court records in a civil case unless the court has made
findings of fact that
826
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Kohl's bill, which served as the model for my original version of the South
Carolina local rule, offers perhaps the best resolution to the secrecy prob-
lem that has simmered for quite some time. Applying to both protective
orders and the sealing of cases and settlements, Senator Kohl's carefully-
crafted legislation proposes a nuanced approach that simply requires
judges to employ a balancing test-weighing the need for secrecy com-
pared to potential harm to the public-and then to make specific factual
findings before entering confidentiality orders. This "balancing test"
would not be a new experience: weighing competing interests is what
(A) such order would not restrict the disclosure of information which is
relevant to the protection of public health or safety; or
(B) (i) the public interest in the disclosure of potential health or safety
hazards is outweighed by a specific and substantial interest in maintaining
the confidentiality of the information or records in question; and
(ii) the requested protective order is no broader than necessary to pro-
tect the privacy interest asserted.
(2) No order entered in accordance with paragraph (1), other than an
order approving a settlement agreement, shall continue in effect after the
entry of final judgment, unless at the time of, or after, such entry the
court makes a separate finding of fact that the requirements of paragraph
(1) have been met.
(3) The party who is the proponent for the entry of an order, as pro-
vided under this section, shall have the burden of proof in obtaining such
an order.
(4) This section shall apply even if an order under paragraph (1) is re-
quested-
(A) by motion pursuant to rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure; or
(B) by application pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.
(5) (A) The provisions of this section shall not constitute grounds for the
withholding of information in discovery that is otherwise discoverable
under rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) No party shall request, as a condition for the production of discov-
ery, that another party stipulate to an order that would violate this
section.
(b) (1) A court shall not approve or enforce any provision of an agree-
ment between or among parties to a civil action, or approve or enforce an
order subject to subsection (a)(1), that prohibits or otherwise restricts a
party from disclosing any information relevant to such civil action to any
Federal or State agency with authority to enforce laws regulating an activ-
ity relating to such information.
(2) Any such information disclosed to a Federal or State agency shall be
confidential to the extent provided by law.
(c) (1) Subject to paragraph (2), a court shall not enforce any provision
of a settlement agreement between or among parties that prohibits 1 or
more parties from-
(A) disclosing that a settlement was reached or the terms of such settle-
ment, other than the amount of money paid; or
(B) discussing a case, or evidence produced in the case, that involves
matters related to public health or safety.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if the court has made findings of fact
that the public interest in the disclosure of potential health or safety
hazards is outweighed by a specific and substantial interest in maintaining
the confidentiality of the information.
Sunshine in Litigation Act, S. 2449, 110th Cong. (2007).
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judges do on a daily basis. The "Sunshine in Litigation" legislation would
apply, in my opinion, to no more than five percent of the civil cases in
federal courts-a minuscule amount. The burden would be light, the
benefit great.
The confidentiality debate will surely rage on and a consensus may
never be reached. I believe, however, that we are at the tipping point.
Secrecy's dark side has been exposed to, and appreciated by, policymakers
in both the judicial and legislative branch, thereby enlightening them to
the importance of transparency in our courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West NewJersey (the form-
ative document for the State of New Jersey) provided, in part:
"[I] n all publick courts ofjustice for tryals of causes, civil or crim-
inal, any person . . . may freely come into, and attend the said
courts . . . that justice may not be done in a corner nor in any
covert manner."
75
As my father taught me, old law is good law. The founding fathers of New
Jersey got it exactly right.
75. Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, The Charter of Funda-
mental Laws of West New Jersey, Agreed Upon, ch. XXIII (1677), reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry &J. Cooper eds., rev. ed. 1978).
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